CHINA'S ENERGY DREAM

Patricia Adams

The Global Warming Policy Foundation
Briefing 58
About the author
Patricia Adams is an economist and the executive director of Probe International, a Toronto-based NGO that has been involved in the Chinese environmental movement since its beginnings in the mid-1980s through the publication of books such as Damming the Three Gorges and Three Gorges Probe, a news portal published in English and Chinese. As editor of the English language translation of Yangtze! Yangtze!, the book that helped inspire China’s democracy movement, and as an author and contributor to books and journals on China’s environmental crises, she is an authority on China’s environmental policy. Ms Adams, a founder of the World Rainforest Movement and the International Rivers Network, has testified before Congressional and Parliamentary Committees in the US and Canada, and has often appeared in major media, including the BBC, CBC, NPR, ABC, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, the Globe and Mail and National Post.
Executive summary

• China’s insistence at COP 26 on language that endorsed continued fossil fuel use has its roots in two urgent needs. Firstly, without coal, oil, and gas, China’s economy would decline, discrediting the legitimacy of communist rule. Just as important, without fossil fuels Chinese president Xi Jinping would be unable to reach his overarching goal – to make China the world’s supreme power by the year 2049, the centennial of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

• China uses the climate agenda both as a way to strengthen its economy and as a weapon for weakening other countries. It now monopolises the global wind and solar industries, although its own renewable energy infrastructure, as everywhere, is unreliable (and therefore requires thermal generation backup), costly, and subject to high rates of curtailment. But its domestic renewables sites serve as effective demonstration projects for tours by Western environmentalists, who then lobby their governments to buy these expensive and unreliable forms of energy. When they do, it gives China two wins for the West’s two losses.

• On the same model of profiting from the sale to the West of crippling technologies, China hopes to dominate the electric vehicle market.

• By pursuing unilateral climate policies, Western countries are hobbling their economies through rising energy costs, power blackouts and other supply shortages as surely as wartime saboteurs might, only the damage is self-inflicted and systemwide. No weapon is more potent at crippling Western economies than the net zero agenda. China’s army here includes western environmental NGOs and media, who together give naïve politicians their marching orders.

• For the Communist regime to survive, and that is surely the CCP’s top priority, fossil fuels for economic growth must be secure, explaining why all the state’s resources are rallied to the task.

• The pursuit of CO2 reductions within China would serve neither the goal of preserving Communist rule nor becoming the world’s foremost superpower by 2049. To China’s leadership, it is a no-brainer. As far as the CCP is concerned, carbon dioxide reductions only make sense for those it wishes to harm and supplant.
Introduction

The COP 26 climate change summit in Glasgow, in November 2021, was designed to get 190 world leaders to make pledges to cut carbon dioxide emissions and save the planet. The main target was coal, which is responsible for 42 per cent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions and is far more polluting than alternative energy sources, including other fossil fuels. But at the eleventh hour, India and China, the world’s largest consumers, demanded a change to the text of the agreement. Without the fig leaf of support from Beijing, in particular, the pretence of climate negotiations would be over. The COP 26 summit therefore caved, and the language changed, from an urgent commitment to ‘phase out’ the use of coal power, to ‘phase down’, suggesting a slow-walk in reductions that would allow continued use of coal indefinitely.

China’s insistence on language that endorsed continued fossil fuel use has its roots in two urgent needs. Firstly, without coal, oil, and gas, its economy would underperform, discrediting the legitimacy of communist rule. Just as important, without fossil fuels, Chinese president Xi Jinping would be unable to reach his overarching goal – to make China the world’s supreme power by the year 2049, the centennial of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

In 2012, Xi announced that his nation would embark on a ‘Great Rejuvenation’ project, during his first speech as president. Using the language of his imperial ancestors, he declared an aim to restore China’s position as a world superpower. As the Chinese over the centuries have understood, under the notion of Tianxia, or the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, China’s ruler has a divine right – some would say is compelled – to rule through a world government.

That mandate was interrupted by a century of national humiliation at the hands of the Western powers and Japan, who subjugated the Qing dynasty and the Republic of China from 1839 to 1949. An exhibit at the Chinese National Museum in Beijing describes that period as one in which ‘the imperial powers descend on China like a swarm of bees, looting our treasures and killing our people’.

To reverse this humiliation, President Xi has created detailed plans for every part of the economy and national life, ‘from space to seabed’. Under propagandistic programs such as The China Dream, Made in China 2025, and now Common Prosperity, the so-called ‘China Model’ for innovation, governance, and military development would see China replace the US as the world’s superpower. In July 2021, on the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding, Xi donned a Mao suit and, in a fiery speech to an audience of 70,000, thundered that:

The Chinese people will never allow any foreign forces to bully, coerce and enslave us. Whoever attempts to do that, will surely crack their heads and spill blood on the steel Great Wall built with the blood and flesh of 1.4 billion Chinese.
War without fighting

Although much is made of the rapid rate at which China is militarily rising – it already has the world’s largest army and navy\textsuperscript{12} – to the Chinese way of thinking, delivering global pre-eminence through military victory on the battlefield would represent an inelegant second best. As the legendary Chinese general and author of \textit{The Art of War}, Sun Tzu, said, ‘The greatest victory is that which requires no battle’\textsuperscript{13} To meet this ideal, President Xi has been working to take over the world without firing a single shot. China’s many contradictory positions on climate change are best understood in this context.

Subverting international institutions

China’s bulletless war is based on Sun Tzu’s maxim that ‘All warfare is based on deception’. Recent history attests to the West’s inclination to be deceived. In one Cold War theatre – multilateral organisations – the West lulled itself into believing that an engaged China would become a liberal democracy, while Beijing busied itself subverting the institutions in order to entrench and further its totalitarianism.

For example, at the UN, China has acquired leadership positions by buying votes from poor countries. To instal Beijing’s vice-minister for agriculture, Qu Dongyu, as Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN’s biggest technical agency, China is believed to have bribed Cameroon to withdraw its candidate by slashing $78 million in Cameroon-government debt.\textsuperscript{14} Referring to Beijing’s strategic grip over UN agencies, US ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘They exert enormous influence in the United Nations, and it’s malign…[it is an] influence that promotes an authoritarian approach to multilateralism’\textsuperscript{15}

The co-chair\textsuperscript{16} of the working group of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which in August 2021 produced a 4000-page document\textsuperscript{17} declaring the need for ‘strong, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions, and reaching net-zero \(\text{CO}_2\) emissions’\textsuperscript{18} is an appointee of the Chinese Communist Party. Three of the 15 UN specialised agencies are headed by Chinese nationals, including the FAO, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDP). Since 2007, the position of under-secretary-general for the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has been held by Chinese career diplomats, giving Beijing opportunities to reshape the UN’s development programs in accordance with its interests.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition, China has taken over the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council.\textsuperscript{20} While pressuring countries and companies to subscribe to an authoritarian alternative to the UN’s international human rights system, Chinese envoys are simultaneously working from within that system to hollow it out, most directly by redefining human
rights as ‘a right to development’, rather than as universal rights of individuals that must be upheld by governments. ‘Only with greater development can human rights be better promoted,’ said Chen Xu, China’s ambassador in Geneva, in July.

In its recent report, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee called this ‘creeping capture of organisations by China’ and its autocratic state allies ‘malign’. It accused China of using its economic leverage and aggressive diplomacy ‘to coerce states to back their position or their candidates, and then use organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council, the International Criminal Court and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘to shift policies away from the cooperation the organisations were created to promote’. These diplomatic coups led the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee chair, Tom Tugendhat, to warn that ‘Dictatorships are taking over the institutions built out of the wreckage of the Second World War to defend democracy’.

Interpol was an especially valuable capture for China, since it allows the CCP to use Interpol’s international arrest-warrant system and a variety of extra-legal means to hunt down the CCP’s overseas political enemies, whistleblowers, and potentially even dissidents.

**Extending its reach**

China has long been expanding its territorial reach in what might seem unlikely areas. It joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1985 with promises to protect the South Pole, but according to Australian observers, ‘China has conducted undeclared military activities in Antarctica, is building up the case for a territorial claim, and is engaging in minerals exploration; all activities that are expressly forbidden by the Antarctic Treaty.’ Former White House National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien was not surprised, ‘as we have seen in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, cyber economic espionage, and in trade, the Chinese Communist Party willfully disregards international agreements when it is convenient to do so.’

In the opposite polar region, China is lobbying hard to become a ‘near Arctic state’ in the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established by the eight Arctic states with the goal of promoting cooperation in the Arctic. Here China is playing the environment and good governance card, calling for an ‘Ice Silk Road’ framework that could ‘represent a new direction for future Arctic governance and cooperation’ to control decisions concerning shipping and energy developments. As Chinese maritime specialist Shi Chunlin wrote in 2010, ‘The Arctic sea route is a strategic military route; whoever controls the Arctic will have the upper hand over other opponents.’

Joseph Bosco, former China country director for the US Secretary of Defense, points out that China continues its successful gray-zone expansionism in the South China Sea, East China Sea...
and Taiwan Strait. ‘While modulating its activities to evade a significant Western response, Beijing is creating facts on the ground, on the ocean, and in the air in each of the region’s hot spots;’ he says. What might start out as an apparent temporary or transitory infringement ‘could easily morph into a permanent Chinese presence that could be broken only by overt military action that would then trigger a full-fledged Chinese military response.’ China’s neighbours might then stand down, for fear of being perceived the aggressor. ‘As both Sun Tzu and communist doctrine instruct, China would then “win without fighting”.’

Emboldened by his South China Sea successes, Xi is replicating that model in the Himalayas, aggressively building new villages and military facilities in disputed borderlands. The aim is ‘to extend or consolidate its control over strategically important areas that India, Bhutan, and Nepal maintain fall within their national boundaries,’ says Brahma Chellaney, a geostrategist with India’s Centre for Policy Research, who adds:

The new installations range from electronic warfare stations and air defense sites to underground ammunition depots. This approach blends conventional and irregular tactics with small incremental territorial encroachments (or ‘salami slicing’), psychological manipulation, disinformation, lawfare, and coercive diplomacy.

China also uses its control of much of the Himalayan plateau as a weapon against its neighbours. By building cascades of large dams on international rivers just before they leave its territory, China is re-engineering cross-border natural flows and giving it a throttlehold on the headwaters of Asia’s major river systems. It is using ‘the water tower of Asia,’ as Tibet is known, to bargain with or threaten many Asian nations. Ten major Asian rivers, including the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Yellow, Yangtze and Mekong originate in Tibet and flow through China, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia and Laos. These rivers are the lifeline of some two billion people in South and Southeast Asia. Incidents of flash water releases and unannounced holdbacks have already blindsided downstream countries, demonstrating that China has the power to weaponise the region’s fresh water supplies.

**The centrality of the economic theatre**

However, the economy – within which energy and climate policies fall – is arguably the most important theatre in which China’s struggle for world domination is being fought. A decade ago, Colonel Liu, a professor at the National Defense University – an elite academy tasked with training senior officers in the People’s Liberation Army – endorsed the strategy of developing economic prowess in aid of military goals. He urged China to replace the US as the top global player by building its economy into the world’s biggest and complementing it with a formidable military.

China’s route to industrial supremacy has rarely followed le-
gitimate paths. It joined the WTO in 2001 with promises to follow fair trade rules, but then systematically violated them, using high tariffs and non-tariff barriers to protect home industries, constantly changing regulations, closing markets to foreigners, purloining key technologies and intellectual property through cyberespionage, physical theft and forced technology transfer, forcing joint ventures with Chinese companies, and subsidising the exports of government-owned ‘national’ champions. The subsidies, whether achieved through direct financial transfers, by ignoring environmental and health and safety standards, or by making cheap loans to manufacturers, crushed China’s free-market competitors, wiping out once-diversified global markets in steel, railway, pharmaceuticals, rare-earth minerals, and green technologies such as wind and solar.\(^\text{35}\)

As part of the same strategy, China preyed on weak countries, locking up their natural resources with ‘debt traps’ to gain a global stranglehold on key resources such as bauxite, copper, nickel,\(^\text{36}\) and lithium.\(^\text{37}\) China now dominates industries from ship production and refrigerators to colour TV sets, air conditioners, and computers, and has become the globe’s second largest economy.\(^\text{38}\)

China also employs methods to hurt Western economies directly. Through cyberwarfare, it aims to defeat the West psychologically by reminding us that it has the power to control our economies and governance.\(^\text{39}\) According to the National Security Agency, the FBI and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, China’s prolific, effective, and malicious cyberespionage activities, which target political, economic, military and educational institutions, as well as critical infrastructure, present a major threat to the US and its allies.\(^\text{40}\) National Security Agency officials warned the Congressional House Intelligence Committee as far back as 2014\(^\text{41}\) that China and ‘probably one or two other’ countries have the capacity to shut down the nation’s power grid\(^\text{42}\) and other critical infrastructure through a cyberattack.

As one example of the routine cyber costs that Western industries face, in March 2021, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) launched a massive cyberattack on Microsoft Exchange email servers.\(^\text{43}\) The attack was carried out by criminal contract hackers working for the MSS who also engage in cyber-enabled extortion, cryptojacking and ransomware. Their digital assaults, which have been going on for years, have cost ‘governments and businesses billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property, ransom payments and cybersecurity mitigation efforts’, noted Secretary of State Antony Blinken.\(^\text{44}\)

**Climate policy as a weapon**

China uses climate policy both as a way to strengthen its economy and as a weapon for weakening other countries. It now monopolises the wind and solar industries, although its own green power infrastructure, as everywhere, is unreliable (and therefore requires thermal generation backup), costly, and subject to high rates of curtailment.\(^\text{45}\) But its domestic renewables sites do serve as effective demonstration projects for tours by Western environmentalists, who then lobby Western nations to buy these expensive and unreliable forms of energy. When they do, it gives China two wins for the West’s two losses. On the same model
of profiting from the sale to the West of crippling technologies, China hopes to dominate the electric vehicle market.

Conventional war is a zero-sum activity, in which reducing the enemy’s military capabilities is as beneficial as increasing one’s own. This logic also applies to a Cold War, particularly for a communist country that sees economic competition as a zero-sum game. From China’s perspective, to win the economic war, bringing the enemy’s economy down is as worthwhile an endeavour as augmenting one’s own.

While cyberwarfare attacks an economy by stealth, climate change policies do so in plain sight. No better example exists of China’s execution of Sun Tzu’s maxim: ‘The opportunity to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself’. By pursuing climate policies, Western countries are hobbling their economies through power blackouts and other supply shortages as surely as wartime saboteurs might, only the damage is self-inflicted and system-wide. No weapon is more potent at crippling Western economies than climate change. China’s army here includes western environmental NGOs and media, who together give the politicians their marching orders.

There is no doubt that this approach is working. The current attempts to implement a Green New Deal, a sweeping remake of America that, it is alleged, ‘will convert the old, gray economy into a new, sustainable economy that is environmentally sound, economically viable and socially responsible’ would cost the US economy some $9 trillion per year in GDP, according to an estimate from the American Enterprise Institute. Given that the total US GDP is about $21 trillion, if ever it was comprehensively attempted, a Green New Deal would cripple the economy. The climate portion of the project alone could cost up to $12 trillion over a decade. In Texas, where state mandates and federal subsidies have made wind the second largest source of electricity, power became unreliable and outright failed during a cold snap in February 2021. As the cold weather worsened, half the state’s wind generation sat frozen and immobile. While wind provided 42% of the state’s electricity on February 7, it fell to 8% on February 11. In contrast:

Even though the extreme cold had frozen cooling systems on coal plants and natural gas pipelines, the state’s coal plants still upped their output by 47% in response to increasing demand. Natural gas plants across the state increased their output by an amazing 450%. Fossil fuels have done yeoman’s work to make up for wind’s reliable unreliability.

The experience elsewhere in the West has also been ruinous. In Germany, the plan to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy by midcentury –the Energiewende – was projected by one of the Fraunhofer Institutes to cost about €1.1 trillion. With rising energy costs, manufacturers have begun to leave Germany for the US, where climate change policies are more talk and less action.

In the UK, the 368-page plan to turn Britain green by 2050, Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener, has a price tag of at least £3 trillion. Onward, a think tank, estimated that delivering Net Zero by 2025 would
require 270,000 more plumbers, three times the number currently working in Britain, to replace gas boilers with low-carbon alternatives such as electric heat pumps. Professor Michael Kelly estimates that the additional workforce required to deliver retrofitted insulation to the UK housing stock would be equivalent in size to that working in the NHS.54

China is doing everything it can to encourage the West to continue its pursuit of climate reforms. Moreover, it promises to do its part too, going as far as to assume a leadership role. At the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, on 21 September 2021, Xi Jinping stressed the importance of improving global environmental governance, actively responding to climate change and creating ‘a community of life for man and nature’. In China’s dealings with other developing countries, he pledged to stop building new coal-fired power projects in favour of developing green and low-carbon energy. Domestically, he promised to accelerate the transition to a green and low-carbon economy, to reach carbon neutrality. ‘China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This requires tremendous hard work, and we will make every effort to meet these goals,’ he said.55

In reality, these are just platitudes, as the events at COP 26 made clear: western leaders acted true to form, issuing pledges to reduce CO₂ emissions and signing declarations to signal their virtue, all the while accepting China’s refusal to do so. To the Chinese, the West’s gullibility confirms their view of themselves as an inherently superior race. President Xi’s rhetoric aside, his plan is clear. China is going all out, domestically and internationally, to secure more and more fossil fuels to drive its economy and achieve world superpower supremacy.

**China’s Achilles' heel**

**Coal and the CCP’s grip on power**

As noted in the Introduction, cheap reliable energy is necessary to keep the Communist Party in power. So when crippling energy shortages hit China in 2021, Premier Li Keqiang took to the airwaves and ordered the country’s top state-owned energy companies – from coal to electricity and oil – to secure supplies for the winter at all costs. Chinese officials ordered more than 70 mines in Inner Mongolia to ramp up coal production by nearly 100 million tonnes and revived others that had been mothballed.56 ‘We must rectify the local, non-discretionary implementation of power restrictions, production cuts or campaign-like carbon reductions, to ensure a warm winter for people in the northern regions, [while] guaranteeing the stability of industrial chains and the steady development of the national economy,’ Li said.57

Carbon peaking and neutrality is all very well, said Li to the official Xinhua newsagency, but ‘require long-term hard work’. In the meantime, ‘[d]evelopment remains the key to all of the problems [China is facing], while the supply shortage is now the biggest energy insecurity.’58 Translated, he meant that energy security is regime protection and trumps all else.
奋发图强 自力更生 建设祖国
By mid-November 2021, China’s energy crisis was over, thanks to the magic hand of the central planners. ‘China has worked to boost coal production and bring coal prices back to a reasonable range,’ Meng Wei, spokesperson for the National Development and Reform Commission, told a press conference. Coal stockpiles at the country’s power producers have rebounded, and production of natural gas to ensure adequate supplies has been ‘cranked up’ said state news agency, Xinhua.59

As these events, and the outcome at COP 26 make clear, Beijing is not about to abandon coal, its most secure form of energy. In 2020, it accounted for 57 per cent of China’s total energy consumption.60 Last year, its 38.4 gigawatts of new coal-fired power stations was more than three times the new capacity built in the rest of the world.61 Another 247 gigawatts is being planned or developed, with more to follow.62

Last year, Chinese provinces granted construction approval to 47 gigawatts of coal power projects, more than three times the capacity permitted in 2019. As for CO₂ emissions, steel, cement, and heavy manufacturing, predominantly backed by coal power, boosted China’s carbon dioxide emissions by 4 percent in the second half of 2020 compared to the same (pre-pandemic) period the year before.63

The long supply lines for oil and gas
If fossil fuels are indispensable for maintaining the CCP’s grip on power at home, they are also vital for Xi’s plans for world domination. China’s Achilles’ heel is its dependence on foreign sources for its oil and gas, a vulnerability that the country’s super-planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, recently admitted for the first time.64 In its 2020 annual report65 to China’s official decision-making body, the National People’s Congress, the commission barely mentioned climate change, instead pledging to ‘ensure energy security’ to ‘improve our contingency plans in response to major changes in supply and demand at home and abroad’.66

The 2021 report, delivered to the People’s Congress on 5 March, again gave short shrift to climate change, promising only what the West’s environmental NGOs at the time decried as ‘baby steps’ towards decarbonisation.67 China’s focus instead was on the priority of securing energy supplies and its consequent determination to:

…promote the development of energy transportation routes, strengthen our energy reserve capacity, and improve transportation services. We will refine energy contingency plans, improve our risk and emergency response capabilities, and strengthen energy security and resilience.

The planning and reform commission concluded by promising to ‘boost oil and gas exploration and development’ and ‘systematically increase our ability to ensure the supply of coal’.68

China’s dependence on foreigners for its oil – more evident than ever from its stance at COP 26 – has grown steadily. In 2008, its dependence on foreign oil reached 50 per cent for the first time. Last year, it was 73 per cent. The trend is especially worrying to China because, while its oil imports increased by 7.3 per cent last year, its domestic
production inched up a mere 1.6 per cent. Despite its drive for self-sufficiency, Chinese production since 2017 has stalled at 3.8–3.9 million barrels per day.\(^6^9\)

Moreover, most of its oil and gas imports pass through chokeholds: in the South China Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and especially the Strait of Malacca, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and through which roughly 80 per cent of its imported oil transits. These sea lanes are all controlled by other states, making its position precarious in the event of possible conflicts with Taiwan, Japan, India, or the US.\(^7^0\)

**Protecting access to fossil fuels**

China is well aware of the risks to its strategy for world domination, and it is taking a dizzying variety of steps to secure its supply of fossil fuels. In the South China Seas, its navy protects both oil and gas tanker routes into its ports and the far-flung offshore oil and gas resources it is claiming.\(^7^1\) It has also been willing to risk US sanctions by surreptitiously purchasing Iranian oil.\(^7^2\) Meanwhile, to minimise its vulnerability to interruptions at sea, it has also been aggressively developing overland oil and gas routes: from Russia,\(^7^3\) from Burma,\(^7^4\) and from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, with these Central Asian sources feeding pipelines ending in Xinjiang, China’s far-western Muslim province, whose Uighur population it sees as a security threat.\(^7^5\)

The extent to which China recognises its future will be in fossil fuels can also be seen in its vast long-term investments to secure suppliers and delivery routes for its oil deliveries. China now has a permanent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. This, its first overseas naval base, gives it the capacity to undertake and sustain missions geared toward protecting strategic sea lanes. The PLA Navy also operates in the Indian and Arctic Oceans and the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, utilising long-term port deals that span the globe, including in Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, the Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius, Namibia, and Greece. ‘The PRC is attempting to acquire berthing rights in the Azores and is currently negotiating port deals in the Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland.’\(^7^6\)

The jewel in the crown for Xi is the Belt and Road Initiative, a $1 trillion program that invests in infrastructure projects across the world to funnel fossil fuel and other resources to China while enhancing Beijing’s military reach and geopolitical clout. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – a multibillion-dollar program to build highways, rail lines, and pipelines from the port of Gwadar on the Indian Ocean to Xinjiang, the Uighur heartland – will transship oil and natural gas and other raw materials overland through pipelines to Xinjiang, then on to points farther east in China. ‘To put the strategic import of the China-Pakistan link in quantifiable terms, the total distance from China to the Persian Gulf is over 5,000 nautical miles, through waters that, in time of war, will likely be impassable. By contrast, the distance from the Persian Gulf to Gwadar is less than 600 nautical miles.’\(^7^7\)
做大庆式工人，办大庆式企业。
Conclusion

For the regime to survive, and that is surely the CCP’s top priority, fossil fuels for economic growth must be secure, explaining why all the state’s resources are rallied to the task.

The pursuit of CO$_2$ reductions within China would serve neither the goal of preserving Communist rule nor becoming the world’s foremost superpower by 2049. To China’s leadership, it is a no-brainer. Carbon dioxide reductions only make sense for those it wishes to harm and supplant.
Notes

1. ‘Why the failure of COP is good news: India and China have nothing to apologise for in refusing to eliminate coal’ by Fraser Myers in Spiked, 15 November 2021 at https://www.spiked-online.com/2021/11/15/why-the-failure-of-cop-is-good-news/.


5. China Change, op.cit.


10. ‘What is the China Model? Understanding the country’s state-led economic model’ by Abby Johnston Catherine Trautwein, PBS, 17 May 2019 at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/china-trade-war-trump-tariff/. ‘The “China model” is a blend between national control and ownership of resources and economic activities dominated by private entrepreneurs’, Carnegie Asia Program senior fellow Yukon Huang told FRONTLINE and NPR. See this explanation from Chinese state media: ‘What is the unique model behind China’s rapid rise?’ by Zhang Weiwei, CGTN, 3 Jun 2021 at https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-06-03/what-is-the-unique-model-behind-China-s-rapid-rise–10NshmTiuPe/index.html. ‘A mixed economy is the third characteristic of the Chinese model. China has tried to combine the strength of the invisible hand of market forces with the visible hand of the state. China’s economic system is thus called a “socialist market economy”. The Chinese state has shown its competence in mapping out strategic plans and ensuring political and economic stability at the macro level. China is proud that it can plan for the next decades and future generations rather than only for the next 100 days, like the West. The fourth characteristic is the belief in gradual reform and a trial-and-error approach. Given the size and complexity of the country, China has encouraged various experiments, exemplified by China’s special economic zones, where new ideas and practices are tested, such as the sale of land, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, high-tech joint ventures and creative start-ups. Only when new initiatives are shown to work are they extended to the rest of the country’, says Zhang Weiwei a Chinese professor of international relations at Fudan University and a senior research fellow at the Chunqiu Institute.


12. ‘29 largest armies in the world,’ World Atlas at https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/29-largest-armies-in-the-world.html. ‘China has built the world’s largest navy. Now what’s Beijing going to do with it?’ by Brad Lendon, CNN, 5 March 2021 at https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/05/china/china-world-biggest-navy-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html. ‘China’s military is the biggest on the planet (but can it fight America and win?)’ by Sebastien Roblin, The National Interest, May 22, 2019 at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-military-biggest-planet-can-it-fight-america-and-win-58862. ‘What does China really spend on its military?’ by China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/. ‘China’s defense spending has seen a nearly six-fold increase over the past two decades, jumping from $41.2 billion in 2000 to $244.9 billion in 2020. China currently spends more on defense than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam combined, and China’s military spending is second only to the United States…This growth in military spending is tied to China’s rising gross domestic product (GDP). Since 2000, China’s defense expenditures as a share of its GDP has hovered at or below 2 percent. In comparison, US military spending averaged about 3.9 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2020’.


20. ‘China’s influence on the global human rights system: Assessing China’s growing role in the world’ by Sophie Richardson, Brookings Institution, 14 September 2020 at https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/14/chinas-influence-global-human-rights-system and https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf. ‘Particularly under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese government does not merely seek to neutralize UN human rights mechanisms’ scrutiny of China, it also aspires to neutralize the ability of that system to hold any government accountable for serious human rights violations. Increasingly Beijing pursues rights-free development worldwide, and tries to exploit the openness of institutions in democracies to impose its world view and silence its critics…China’s June [2020] resolution seeks to reposition international human rights law as a matter of state-to-state relations, ignores the responsibility of states to protect the rights of the individual, treats fundamental human rights as subject to negotiation and compromise, and foresees no meaningful role for civil society.’


50. ‘There are costs for climate change whether leaders take action or not,’ by Alex Brill, The Hill, 23 March 2021 at https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/544507-there-are-costs-for-climate-change-whether-we-take-action-or-not.


58. Ibid.


66. Lelyveld, op. cit.
67. ‘China’s new plan sends mixed messages on climate trajectory’ by Shi Yi, in India Climate Dialogue, 16 March 2021 at https://indiaclimatedialogue.net/2021/03/16/chinas-new-plan-sends-mixed-messages-on-climate-trajectory/.
69. Ibid.
73. ‘Russia eyes another massive gas pipeline to China’ by Vanand Meliksetian, OilPrice, 8 July 2020 at https://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Russia-Eyes-Another-Massive-Gas-Pipeline-To-China.html.

76. Gershaneck, op. cit.

77. ‘China’s emerging Middle Eastern Kingdom: China’s drive for supremacy is now underway in the Middle East – and it won’t end there’ by Michael Doran and Peter Rough, Tablet, 2 August 2020 at https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/china-middle-eastern-kingdom.
About the Global Warming Policy Foundation
People are naturally concerned about the environment, and want to see policies that enhance human wellbeing and protect the environment; policies that don’t hurt, but help.

The Global Warming Policy Foundation (GWPF) is committed to providing a platform for educational research and informed debates on these important issues.

In order to make progress and advance effective policy assessments, it is essential to cultivate a culture of open debate, tolerance and learning.

Our aim is to raise standards in learning and understanding through rigorous research and analysis, to help inform a balanced debate amongst the interested public and decision-makers.

We aim to create an educational platform on which common ground can be established, helping to overcome polarisation and partisanship. We aim to promote a culture of debate, respect, and a hunger for knowledge.

Views expressed in the publications of the Global Warming Policy Foundation are those of the authors, not those of the GWPF, its trustees, its Academic Advisory Council members or its directors.
THE GLOBAL WARMING POLICY FOUNDATION

Director
Benny Peiser

Honorary President
Lord Lawson

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Dr Jerome Booth (Chairman)
Steve Baker MP
Professor Peter Edwards
Kathy Gyngell
Professor Michael Kelly

Lord Moore
Terence Mordaunt
Graham Stringer MP
Professor Fritz Vahrenholt

ACADEMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL

Professor Christopher Essex (Chairman)
Professor J. Ray Bates
Sir Ian Byatt
Dr John Constable
Professor Vincent Courtillot
Professor Peter Dobson
Christian Gerondeau
Professor Larry Gould
Professor William Happer
Professor Ole Humlum
Professor Gautam Kalghatgi
Professor Terence Kealey
Bill Kininmonth
Brian Leyland

Professor Richard Lindzen
Professor Ross McKitrick
Professor Robert Mendelsohn
Professor Garth Paltridge
Professor Ian Plimer
Professor Gwythian Prins
Professor Paul Reiter
Professor Peter Ridd
Dr Matt Ridley
Sir Alan Rudge
Professor Nir Shaviv
Professor Henrik Svensmark
Dr David Whitehouse
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>The Stern Review: Ten Years of Harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Judith Curry</td>
<td>Climate Models for the Layman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Fritz Vahrenholt</td>
<td>Germany’s Energiewende: a Disaster in the Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Hughes, Aris, Constable</td>
<td>Offshore Wind Strike Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Michael Miersch</td>
<td>Truly Green?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Susan Crockford</td>
<td>20 Good Reasons not to Worry About Polar Bears: Update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mikko Paunio</td>
<td>Sacrificing the Poor: The Lancet on ‘pollution’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Mikko Paunio</td>
<td>Kicking Away the Energy Ladder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Bill Gray</td>
<td>Flaws in Applying Greenhouse Warming to Climate Variability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mikko Paunio</td>
<td>Save the Oceans: Stop Recycling Plastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Andy Dawson</td>
<td>Small Modular Nuclear: Crushed at Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Andrew Montford</td>
<td>Qakes, Pollution and Flaming Faucets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Paul Homewood</td>
<td>DEFRA vs Met Office: Factchecking the State of the UK Climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>J. Ray Bates</td>
<td>Deficiencies in the IPCC’s Special Report on 1.5 Degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Paul Homewood</td>
<td>Tropical Hurricanes in the Age of Global Warming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mikko Paunio</td>
<td>The Health Benefits of Ignoring the IPCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Jack Ponton</td>
<td>Grid-scale Storage: Can it Solve the Intermittency Problem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Robert Lyman</td>
<td>Carbon Taxation: The Canadian Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Rémy Prud'homme</td>
<td>La Transition Énergétique: Useless, Costly, Unfair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Judith Curry</td>
<td>Recovery, Resilience, Readiness: Contending with Natural Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Paul Homewood</td>
<td>Plus Ça Change: The UK Climate in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>David Whitehouse</td>
<td>Cold Water: The Oceans and Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Crockford and Laframboise</td>
<td>The Defenestration of Dr Crockford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Paul Homewood</td>
<td>Britain’s Weather in 2019: More of the Same, Again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>John Constable</td>
<td>The Brink of Darkness: Britain’s Fragile Grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Mike Travers</td>
<td>The Hidden Cost of Net Zero: Rewiring the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Martin Livermore</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Global Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Paul Homewood</td>
<td>The US Climate in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Patricia Adams</td>
<td>The Red and the Green: China’s Useful Idiots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Andrew Montford</td>
<td>Offshore Wind: Cost Predictions and Cost Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Tim Worstall</td>
<td>A Saviour Spurned: How Fracking Saved us from Global Warming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Jun Arima</td>
<td>Eco-fundamentalism as Grist for China’s Mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Gautam Kalghatgi</td>
<td>Scoping Net Zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Andrew Montford</td>
<td>Survival of the Richest: Smart Homes and Energy Rationing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Donna Laframboise</td>
<td>The Hounding of Roger Pielke Jr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Patricia Adams</td>
<td>China’s Energy Dream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>